By now you are asking, "What does this have to do with missionary work?" Well, I have recently been reading the sixth volume of Morison's history and came across a story which illustrated a quote from Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, to wit, "Truths from the mouths of curmudgeons is truth all the same." Often we choose not to listen to certain people, based on appearances or who we think they are, or some other criteria, but truth is truth no matter the source.
Blind unbelief is sure to err
And scan his works in vain;
God is his own interpreter,
And he shall make it plain.
(Hymn #285 "God Moves in a Mysterious Way")
Truth and plainness can come from unexpected places, which the following story from Morison may help illustrate.
"Another grave defect arose from the excessive respect for rank and position in Japan," prefaces Morison. "The initiation of suggestions about strategic plans, which any officer could venture in the United States, was in Japan the prerogative of Naval General Staff and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, and anyone who brought unwelcome information or intelligence to the top men was apt to be snubbed."
When war broke out between Japan and the United States, diplomats of each country were interned by the other until an exchange was made starting in August 1942. On the first exchange ship was a Rear Admiral Yokoyama, who had been the Japanese naval attaché in Washington during 1941, the assistant attaché, and a naval intelligence officer from the Japanese legation in Mexico City. "In addition to what they already knew," wrote Morison, "they had ample opportunity to learn more at Hot Springs, where they had full access to the American press."
Upon arrival in Tokyo, the three men were immediately sequestered at Naval General Headquarters where they were to play a war game using their fresh knowledge. Playing the commanders of the United States, they started farther back than where the forces of the United States then actually were -- for the purposes of the game, it was assumed that Japan had recaptured Guadalcanal. Despite the handicap, the team playing the role of U.S. commanders managed to retake the Philippine Islands by October 1, 1944 -- 20 days before General McArthur's return to the Philippines on the island of Leyte in actual fact -- "a pretty good prophecy," noted Morison.
Even so, as the historian goes on to write, "These officers, who so successfully anticipated Nimitz's and McArthur's moves from the Solomon Islands to Leyte Gulf, were, however, ignored. Nobody wanted to their information or their views. We asked one of them [after the war] if anything was said to his winning team by the Naval General Staff. 'Yes,' said he, 'we were told to keep our mouths shut!'"
Morison then adds that initiative on the part of junior flag officers was discouraged in the Japanese Imperial Fleet. "During the war," he wrote, "we wondered why Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka, the destroyer squadron commander whose fine combination of sound training and resourcefulness won the Battle of Tassafaronga, had no command after 1942. The reasons were twofold: he frequently pointed out that the poor quality of air cooperation with surface operations was causing unnecessary ship losses; and, as early as 30 August 1942, he declared to Admiral [Gunichi] Mikawa, 'Guadalcanal should be abandoned as its supply cannot by maintained.' Mikawa replied, 'The Highest Command have decided on recapturing Guadalcanal'; and despite Tanaka's loyal efforts in that direction he was 'put on the beach,' as we say in the United States Navy, after his prophecy had been proved correct."
Tanaka was not the only commander during World War II to be fired for being proved right by events. Air Marshal Hugh Dowding was relived as commander of the Royal Air Force's Fighter Command after it won the Battle of Britain. Dowding's relief has been attributed by some to his singlemindedness, perceived lack of diplomacy and political savoir faire in dealing with intra-RAF challenges and intrigues, particularly the hotly debated Big Wing controversy in which a number of senior and active service officers had argued in favour of large set-piece air battles with the Luftwaffe as an alternative to Dowding's successful strategy of attrition by smaller confrontations with the German Air Force.
Sometimes we get caught up in our own perceived wisdom, perhaps based on our experience as compared to the experience of others. Missionaries are not immune to this symptom of pride. Missionaries in leadership may not see value in the comments of less experienced elders and sisters because they are viewed merely as "greenies." A senior companion may not listen to a junior companion and miss a valuable idea that could advance the work in their area.
In the mid- to late-1990s, a Major John P. Hull of the U.S. Marine Corps wrote in an article published in Proceedings, the periodical of the U.S. Naval Institute, "Candor should be not only encouraged but expected -- if not demanded." He was discussing the importance of communication during staff planning, but the point can be applied to the planning of a pair of missionaries. "Once the commander makes his decision and puts it into action," added Hull, "continued candor remains vital -- although it is never a means of justifying less than full and vigorous support of the commander." If we were to have a formula for this, it might be "full candor before a decision is made, and full support after it is made."
Major Hull went on to say, "Integrity without candor, the 'if you have nothing good to say, say nothing at all' approach, in no way prepares us for or win wars. Its absence often leads to a 'politically correct' interpretation of actions or events, facilitates the perpetuation of a flawed effort, or allows a reinfestation of micromanagement within the ranks."
Missionary companionships, districts or zones, or any other organization, can experience similar problems if candor is missing. It is interesting to note the importance of candor to integrity as the subject of integrity has been discussed previously in this blog. Missionaries have multiple opportunities to communicate with candor, in planning, in weekly companionship inventories, weekly district meetings, monthly zone meetings, and other conferences and training within the mission to which they are assigned.
One final comment by Hull, "We are all quick to jump on the 'people must be allowed to make mistakes' bandwagon, but too often we quietly caveat this with the thought, 'As long as they're not my people.'" There can be a temptation to judge companions and other missionaries because of their weaknesses, and possibly to micromanage companions and other elders and sisters in a district or zone. We are all human, and because of this we all have weaknesses, and we all make mistakes. We should not judge others because we, too, are weak.
General Charles Krulak, who was Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps in the late 1990s, defined a mistake as something that is made when, in an attempt to do something right, someone makes the wrong choice. The distinction, then, is made between mistakes and willful disobedience. Disobedience must be dealt with while people must be allowed to make mistakes.
"There are lessons to be learned from mistakes," said General Krulak. "Good leaders create an environment where subordinates are allowed to make mistakes, yet are not put into situations for which they are unprepared or for which the scope of the mistake could be dangerous." Mistakes, however, are better made in training and preparation than in execution in real situations. "We must be allowed to err in peacetime to ensure that we do not err in combat," said Krulak. "We will not be able to survive if we do otherwise."
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